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Sequence-space synesthetes experience some sequences (e.g., numbers, calendar units)
as arranged in spatial forms, i.e., spatial patterns in their mind’s eye or even outside their
body. Various explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. Here we argue that
these spatial forms are continuous with varieties of non-synesthetic visuospatial imagery
and share their central characteristics. This includes their dynamic and elaborative nature,
their involuntary feel, and consistency over time. Drawing from literatures on mental
imagery and working memory, we suggest how the initial acquisition and subsequent
elaboration of spatial forms could be accounted for in terms of the known developmental
trajectory of visuospatial representations.This extends from the formation of image-based
representations of verbal material in childhood to the later maturation of dynamic control
of imagery. Individual differences in the development of visuospatial style also account for
variation in the character of spatial forms, e.g., in terms of distinctions such as visual versus
spatial imagery, or ego-centric versus object-based transformations.
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In sequence-space synesthesia, sequences members such as cal-
endar units or numerals are felt to occupy locations within an
explicit spatial layout of sequence members – a spatial form –
that resides in imaginal or extra-bodily space, and ranges from
simple 2D to intricate 3D arrangements (Cytowic and Eagle-
man, 2009; Simner, 2009; Price and Mattingley, 2013; Jonas
and Jarick, in press; Price, in press). Typically, the majority of
a synesthete’s spatial forms originate in childhood. While under-
standing the development of non-numerical sequence knowledge
is in its infancy (Berteletti et al., 2012), even less is known
about the developmental origins of sequence-space synesthe-
sia, despite a common incidence [though population estimates
vary widely from 2% (Brang et al., 2010) to 20% (Sagiv et al.,
2006)]. Some suggest unusual brain processes are involved,
perhaps mediated by exaggerated cortical connectivity (e.g., Hub-
bard et al., 2005, 2011; Tang et al., 2008; Eagleman, 2009).
This view sometimes links spatial forms to normal processes
of implicit spatial representation of magnitude (Hubbard et al.,
2005, 2011; Tang et al., 2008; Simner, 2009). Others suggest spa-
tial forms are continuous with standard varieties of visuospatial
mental imagery and best understood as a residue from child-
hood strategies for encoding abstract verbal sequences (Galton,
1880, 1881; Phillips, 1897; Seron et al., 1992; Sagiv et al., 2006;
Price, 2009, in press; Jonas et al., 2011; Price and Mattingley,
2013).
In the latter vein, we offer here a speculative summary of how
initial acquisition and subsequent elaboration of spatial forms
could be accounted for in terms of the known developmental
trajectory of visuospatial representations, drawing from the inter-
connected literatures on mental imagery and visuospatial working
memory.
SEQUENCE-SPACE SYNESTHESIA IS A VARIETY OF
VISUOSPATIAL IMAGERY
Sequence-space synesthesia is characterized by internally gen-
erated visual and/or spatial sensory experience, and has many
experiential similarities with non-synesthetic imagery. We there-
fore suggest that it is per deﬁnition a variety of visuospatial
imagery, and an example of the considerable individual differ-
ences in vividness and prevalence of mental imagery among the
general population (McKelvie, 1995; Borst and Kosslyn, 2010).
Visuospatial imagery occurs in many contexts, both normal and
clinical, but its basic neurocognitive substrates are conventionally
taken to be the same across domains. On grounds of explanatory
parsimony, we therefore also suggest that standard mechanisms
for the production and transformation of conscious visuospa-
tial representations are at very least involved in mediating spatial
forms, perhaps even sufﬁcient (Price and Mattingley, 2013; Price,
in press). Consistent with this, sequence-space synesthetes show
above-average (although not exceptional) non-synesthetic visual
imagery at a subjective level (Price, 2009; Rizza and Price, 2012;
Meier and Rothen, 2013), and possibly also above-average visu-
ospatial skill at a behavioral level (see Price, in press), including the
ability to retain other synesthetes’ formsmore accurately thannon-
synesthetes can (Brang et al., 2010). Furthermore, at least some
behavioral correlates of sequence-space synesthesia can be mim-
icked by use of controlled visuospatial imagery in non-synesthete
participants (Price, 2009).
EARLY ACQUISITION OF EXPLICIT SPATIAL FORMS
At a general level the use of spatial representations to help cat-
egorize the world is acknowledged as important in children’s
learning (e.g., Namy et al., 1997; Schwartz and Heiser, 2006)
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and the ability to construct abstract spatial representations from
verbal symbols is a cornerstone of human spatial cognition (Paz-
zaglia et al., 2012). For example, there is some evidence for an
imagery-based“mental time line” in adult participants where tem-
poral events are spatially mapped (Arzy et al., 2009). Heine et al.
(2011) have also presented EEG data from elementary school
children indicating visual imagery activity during numerical
comparisons.
More speciﬁcally, initial learning of the sequential ordering of
acquired verbal symbols such as numerals or calendar units will
beneﬁt from visuospatial representations because, prior to around
7 years, children tend to show little use of their phonological loop
to rehearse verbal sequences in working memory (Flavell et al.,
1966; Hitch et al., 1988).Whether spatial forms developmay there-
fore depend on individual differences in the ages at which a given
child learns such sequences relative to maturation of their phono-
logical rehearsal. However, even when phonological rehearsal is
available, visuospatial representations will beneﬁt learning and
long-term retention due to the documented advantages of dual
coding (Paivio, 1971; Clark and Paivio, 1991). Apparent random-
ness and irregularity in the layout of some spatial forms may
partly derive from acquisition at these early ages when execu-
tive control over image generation is underdeveloped, and when
spatial layout is less constrained by social conventions of, for
example, left to right writing or circular clockwise time represen-
tation.
Persistence of visuospatial representations into later childhood
and adulthood will be inﬂuenced by continued individual dif-
ferences in reliance on verbal versus non-verbal strategies. In
this respect it is notable that adult sequence-space synesthetes
report prevalent general visual imagery, may show above-average
visuospatial skill in some domains, and seem to adopt more visu-
ospatial strategies (e.g., during some types of mental arithmetic;
Ward et al., 2009). Seron et al. (1992) also reported below-average
scores on self-report measures of verbalizing tendency although
this was not replicated by Meier and Rothen (2013).
However it is important to acknowledge that spatial forms
probably derive from multiple developmental inﬂuences. If they
resulted solely from a developmental delay in phonological
rehearsal, we would expect sequences that are learned earliest in
life to be most prone to elicit spatial forms. But this is not the
case. Numbers 1–30 are on average acquired by children before
the calendar sequence of 12 months, and can be expressed ear-
lier in a linear spatial layout (see Table 1 in Berteletti et al., 2012).
On the other hand, number forms appear to be much less com-
mon than month forms, occurring largely in people who also have
other types of form such as months (Phillips, 1897; Price et al.,
2009). Therefore, although a minority of synesthetes may develop
all their spatial forms due to problematic rote verbal rehearsal in
childhood, additional factors must be at play among the major-
ity of synesthetes. For example, it is possible that that calendar
sequences are more difﬁcult to learn than numbers, and so are
more sensitive to deﬁciencies in verbal rehearsal. Alternatively, the
normal tendency for linear spatial coding of numbers to precede
and later generalize to other sequences such as months (Berteletti
et al., 2012) may be disrupted, perhaps again owing to deﬁcient
verbal encoding, leading to atypical visualization strategies.
FURTHER ELABORATION OF SPATIAL FORMS
Moving beyond the advantages of visuospatial representations for
initial acquisition of sequences, calendar sequences may induce
spatial forms more often than numbers because they are more
likely to be taught diagrammatically in the ﬁrst place. Although
most synesthetes forget the origins of their forms, some do claim
their calendar formswere inﬂuenced by exposure to diagrammatic
representations from school, TV, calendars, etc. In addition to such
environmental inﬂuences, continuing developmental incentives
for spatial forms may include more complex representational roles
such as depicting the cyclical nature of calendar sequences via
closed circles.
Once established, spatial forms are reported to increase in com-
plexity from childhood to adulthood (Phillips, 1897; Morton,
1936). This complexity can include creative symbolism such as
bends in number lines at decade breaks, distortions of date lines
to mark personally signiﬁcant events, and the use of spatial extent
in month or weekday forms to represent the personal importance
of some time periods (Price and Mattingley, 2013). By contrast
to earlier randomness in forms, controlled and complex imagery
of this kind, along with improved processing of spatial relations
between objects, will be more dependent on attentional executive-
basedprocesses (Pearson et al., 1996; Pearson,2007)whichdevelop
markedly from the age of six onward (Gathercole et al., 2004;
Chevalier et al., 2013).
As the ability to generate and transform spatial forms matures,
theywill evolvemany characteristics that are continuouswith stan-
dard controlled visuospatial imagery. These include elaboration
of the forms (e.g., from simple spatial trajectories of sequence
members into ribbon or tube-like structures), integration of other
associated visual imagery into the form, the continued growth
of existing forms such as personal time lines, the development
of entirely new forms, and the ability to dynamically transform
viewpoint such as zooming into the form or navigating within
or around the form (Price and Mattingley, 2013; Price, in press).
Skill in shifting one’s attentional window on the form may be
exploited by those synesthetes who claim to use their calendar
forms as associative mnemonic systems such as weekly or yearly
diaries, or use historical time lines to encode autobiographical
and biographical dates (Simner et al., 2009). In a minority of
unusual synesthetes who report a great number of forms, visu-
alization strategies appear to extend beyond classic sequences to
provide general classiﬁcation systems or mnemonics for shoes
sizes, the Lord’s Prayer, etc. Just as self-report measures reveal
a wide distribution in the vividness of the mental imagery experi-
enced by non-synesthetes, so the salience and vividness of spatial
forms seems to run in graded fashion from the most exotic
forms, via vague semi-voluntary forms, to no experience of forms
at all.
INVOLUNTARY FEELING AND CONSISTENCY ARE NOT
UNIQUE TO SYNESTHETIC IMAGERY
Although the common claim that sequence-space synesthesia
is strongly automatic has been challenged (Price and Mattin-
gley, 2013), spatial forms are nevertheless usually reported to
have an involuntary feel. Additionally, although spatial forms do
appear to evolve over time, their relative stability as long term
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representations is one of their notable characteristics (Jonas and
Jarick, in press). Involuntary feeling and consistency over time
have traditionally been taken as central hallmarks of synesthe-
sia. However even these properties of spatial forms are shared by
non-synesthetic visuospatial imagery.
In both healthy and clinical populations, imagery experiences
commonly result from involuntary as well as deliberate recall
processes (Pearson et al., 2013). Regular experience of recurrent
involuntary memory is widespread, and occurs for positive and
neutral memories as well as negative ones (Berntsen and Rubin,
2008). Pearson et al. (2013) argue that intrusive mental imagery
also plays an important role within clinical psychopathology and
is associated with many disorders, including post-traumatic stress
disorder and social phobia. In addition, according to the Elabo-
rated Intrusion theory of craving (Kavanagh et al., 2005), mental
imagery plays a key role during craving for addictive substances
and is a hallmark of the phenomenology associated with craving
(Andrade et al., 2012). Intrusive imagery may often seem spon-
taneous, but arises frequently and with involuntary feel merely
due to its ease of retrieval when activated by cues via the nor-
mal mechanisms of associative retrieval. These cues may be either
external (Keane et al., 1991; Carlesimo, 1994) or internal (Pear-
son, 2012; Pearson et al., 2012; Krans et al., 2013) in nature. Ease
of retrieval also accounts for easy voluntary activation of such
images. By analogy, spatial forms seem frequently activated in
an involuntary manner by relevant cues (e.g., a month name, or
thinking generally about the year calendar), as well as easily acti-
vated in a more strategic manner (e.g., strategic memorization
via associative placement of retrospective or prospective events
within a spatial form, illustrated by exceptional date memory
among synesthetes with forms for historical time; Simner et al.,
2009). Note that Price and Mattingley (2013) suggest voluntary
activation of spatial forms plays a critical role in several experi-
mental paradigms which have been claimed previously to demon-
strate the automaticity and inﬂexibility of synesthetes’ spatial
associations.
The content of recurrent intrusive imagery is usually very con-
sistent in terms of what is depicted in the image (Engelhard
et al., 2011; Schulze et al., 2013). Alongside ease of access, con-
sistency is also a characteristic of the often complex visuospatial
imagery that may develop as a mnemonic strategy among non-
synesthetes, including professional mnemonists. Importantly,
effective mnemonic imagery needs to be consistent and well-
established in long-term memory in order to provide a stable
framework for encoding of to-be-remembered material (e.g.,
Paivio, 1971; Maguire et al., 2003).
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SPATIAL FORMS REFLECT
SEPARABLE SUBCOMPONENTS OF VISUOSPATIAL IMAGERY
In the attempt to establish sequence-space synesthesia as a legit-
imate and deﬁned topic within cognitive neuroscience, the het-
erogeneity of spatial forms has tended to be overlooked. Spatial
forms vary not merely in their vividness, personal importance,
complexity, and involuntariness, but also in their spatial frame of
reference, in whether they feel like static depictive visual images or
like spatial models, and in the types of spatial transformation that
can most naturally be applied to them (Price, in press). Aspects
of this rich variation can be naturally accounted for in terms of
the separable subcomponents of normal visuospatial imagery, and
individual differences in the skills mediated by those subcom-
ponents.
For example, the term “visuospatial imagery” blurs the partial
separability, at experiential, behavioral, and neural levels, between
“visual” versus “spatial” aspects of visuospatial imagery (Mazard
et al., 2004; Kosslyn et al., 2007). While incompletely understood,
this distinction refers respectively to a more holistic encoding of
the visual or“depictive”appearance of imaged entities, versusmore
explicit representation of the relative spatial positions of objects or
object parts (Hegarty, 2010). It is claimed that individuals tend to
be either object visualizers, favoring a more visual style of imagery
that is associated with vivid high resolution imagery and supe-
rior performance on visual memory tasks, or spatial visualizers,
favoring good spatial analysis and dynamic image transforma-
tions such as mental rotation (Kozhevnikov et al., 2005, 2010;
Blajenkova et al., 2006). A distinction between object visualizers,
spatial visualizers, and verbalizers is also claimed in in the devel-
opment of cognitive styles among 8- to 17-year olds (Blazhenkova
et al., 2011).
There is ongoing debate over whether the experiential charac-
ter of spatial forms and the behavioral skills of sequence-space
synesthetes correspond more closely to the traits of object or
spatial visualizers (see Price, in press). For example three stud-
ies now show that, for self-report measures, it is in the visual
rather than spatial domain that people with “spatial” forms show
above-average scores (Price,2009; Rizza andPrice,2012;Meier and
Rothen, 2013; see also Eagleman, 2009). However our observa-
tion of synesthetes’ descriptions of their experiences is that spatial
forms can reﬂect characteristics of either trait – i.e., an emphasis
on visual detail as seen from one egocentrically deﬁned external
viewpoint, or on spatial locations of sequence members in a spa-
tial map that can be navigated as an immersive mental model.
One solution to this paradox is that a subset of synesthetes with
a spatial visualizer trait have not been detected by studies with
small samples or averaged data. Another solution is that visual
versus spatial imagery are practically interdependent, even if con-
ceptually separable. For example, a spatial model may be more
complex and abstract than a visual image, but visual imagery skill
may remain important to instantiate particular views of the spatial
model (Pazzaglia et al., 2012). Alternatively, a spatial form could
start life as a visual image but develop over time into a spatial
model. There is a salient parallel here with literature on human
spatial navigation: when people construct spatial representations
from verbal input, a hierarchical developmental progression is
reported from reliance on landmarks (i.e., an initial focus on spe-
ciﬁc views), to routes (i.e., a progression through landmarks), to
a more ﬂexible survey description (i.e., a spatial model; Nori and
Guisberti, 2003). Furthermore, adults seem to show preference
for one or other of these levels of spatial representation (Pazza-
glia et al., 2000) which, like the overlapping distinction between
object/spatial-visualizers, may map onto typologies of spatial
form.
For those spatial formswhich reach the developmental sophisti-
cation of a spatial model, their dynamic transformation is another
area where individual differences can be informed by fractionation
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of visuospatial imagery skills. Some synesthetes report object-
centered transformation – e.g., as the months go by, their spatial
model of the calendar months rotates around or in front of
them. Others report ego-centric transformations – e.g., they feel
they navigate through, or around, their spatial model. Price (in
press) suggests that synesthetes’ preferred mode of transformation
may be related to known individual differences in object- versus
ego-centric transformation skill which rely on distinct neural pro-
cessing resources and are partly independent at a behavioral level,
as revealed by visuospatial psychometric tests (Zacks and Miche-
lon, 2005). Interestingly, a classic distinction in spatial metaphor
for time among the general non-synesthete population is between
ego-moving metaphors (observer feels they move along a time
line toward the future) and time-moving metaphors (time is felt
to move like a river past the observer; Clark, 1973; Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980; Gentner et al., 2002). This raises the possibility
that spatial forms and non-synesthetes’ spatial metaphors both
reﬂect similar individual differences in aptitude for one or other
mode of visuospatial image transformation.
A practical implication of these kinds of individual differences
is that visuospatial skills will differ among synesthetes. Unless
synesthetes’ individual proﬁles are carefully aligned, group com-
parisons of their behavioral skills versus control samples stand in
danger of confusion and inconsistency.
SPATIAL FORMS AND IMPLICIT SPATIAL REPRESENTATION
OF MAGNITUDE
Our approach differs from suggestions (Hubbard et al., 2005,
2011; Tang et al., 2008; Simner, 2009) that spatial forms are an
abnormally explicit expression of the analog spatial representa-
tions which represent magnitude, not just of numbers but across
many continuous perceptual dimensions (ATheory of Magnitude,
ATOM, Walsh, 2003). As argued by de Hevia et al. (2006), this use
of space as a general analog continuous representation for mag-
nitude, exempliﬁed in the concept of the implicit Mental Number
Line (MNL), can be contrasted with the ordering of discrete items
of information (e.g., symbolic labels) in representational space.
Indeed, neuropsychological data show representation of magni-
tude and ordinality to be dissociated, even though they interact
(Berteletti et al., 2012). We suggest that a fundamental problem
in attempting to align spatial forms with systems for magnitude
representation is that most spatial forms express non-magnitude
sequences, such as calendar units or the alphabet, unlike numbers
which possess cardinality as well as ordinality. Moreover, in spatial
forms, the use of spatial extension to represent personal impor-
tance rather than temporal length of certain months illustrates
that magnitude representation is not their main function. Rather,
they are easily activated, long-term, visuospatial representations
of ordinality which aid some individuals to acquire, retrieve, and
mentally navigate within abstract sequences, which can be elabo-
rated to symbolize further information, andwhichmay sometimes
provide a facilitative template for further associative memories.
CONCLUSION
Central hallmarks of sequence-space synesthesia, including invol-
untary feel, consistency over time, dynamic nature, and elaborative
imagery, are not unique to this variety of imagery, but shared by
everyday visuospatial imagery, intrusive imagery, and mnemonic
imagery. Furthermore, a visuospatial developmental perspective
illuminates why and when sequence-space synesthesia originates
in some people, and why its character varies between synesthetes.
We therefore suggest strong continuity between synesthetic spatial
forms and normal processes of visuospatial imagery.
Interest in the relationship between mental imagery and synes-
thesia is by no means conﬁned to sequence-space synesthesia, and
there is growing evidence that other varieties of synesthesia are also
associated with above-average visual imagery (Meier and Rothen,
2013; Price, in press). However evidence also suggests that pre-
disposition to experience this variety of synesthesia is separable
from other types of synesthesia (Novich et al., 2011), and that it is
associated with a different grouping of cognitive styles compared,
for example, with grapheme-color synesthesia (Meier and Rothen,
2013). The extent to which our current perspective may extend to
other varieties of synesthesia therefore remains an open question.
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